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C O M M E N T S

Changing the National Flood Insurance
Program for a Changing Climate
by Dena Adler, Michael Burger, Rob Moore, and Joel Scata
Dena Adler is a Fellow and Michael Burger is the Executive Director at the Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School. Rob Moore is a Senior Policy Analyst and
Joel Scata is a Water & Climate Attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council.

C

ongress established the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) in 1968 to reduce flood damages nationwide and ease the federal government’s
financial burden for providing disaster recovery.1 To
achieve this goal, the program was designed to perform
three primary functions. First, the program provides federally backed insurance to property owners and renters. Second, the program established minimum requirements for
building, land use, and floodplain management practices
that local communities must adopt in order for their residents to be eligible to purchase NFIP insurance coverage.
Third, the program is responsible for mapping high floodrisk areas. These maps inform local land use decisions as
well as the pricing of flood insurance premiums.
Theoretically, the NFIP should have deterred development in flood-prone areas, ensured that any new development in the floodplain was designed to minimize the
risk of flood damage, and reduced federal expenditures
on disaster recovery costs. In practice, the rising debts of
the program and growing severity and frequency of flood
disasters imply the opposite is true. One significant factor contributing to this shortcoming is that the NFIP is
predicated on the assumption that flood risks are static
and change little over time. Climate change is proving that
assumption to be extremely dangerous and costly.
This Comment will assess the current state of the NFIP
and the threats to it from climate change (Part I). In addition, it explores several strategies to change the NFIP for a
changing climate.

Authors’ Note: We are greatly appreciative of research support from
our student interns Sophia Cornell, Samantha Doss, Korinna
Garfield, Adelaide Jones, and Joe Liberman.
1.

National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, and the Flood Disaster
Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.A. §§4001 et seq. It was further modified
by the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 and the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004.
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These strategies include:
• Encourage long-term migration away from coastal
areas and floodplains through a national “discounts
for buyouts” program that would offer homeowners
discounts on their flood insurance premiums now,
in exchange for a commitment to accept a future
buyout once their home is substantially damaged by
flooding (Part II).
• Expedite bringing vulnerable properties into compliance with floodplain development requirements that
decrease the potential for flood damage by community adoption of a cumulative and/or lower threshold
“substantial damage” or “substantial improvement”
standard (Part III).
• Increase the transparency and availability of information on flood damages, number and cost of policies, information on repeatedly flooded properties,
costs of the program to the nation, and the level of
enforcement by participating communities through
a national “homeowner right-to-know” provision,
and at the state level improve disclosure policies
that inform homebuyers about flood-related risks
(Part IV).
• Improve monitoring, tracking, and disclosure of
data related to community compliance and provide
resources to address barriers to enforcement that
impede implementation of the floodplain regulations
at the community level (Part V).
Collectively, these reforms can help restructure the NFIP
to prevent escalation of debts, reduce taxpayer burden, and
most importantly increase the safety of millions of vulnerable homeowners.

I.

The NFIP and Climate Change

Today, the NFIP has 5.1 million flood insurance policies
providing $1.3 trillion of insurance coverage to policy-
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holders in more than 22,000 communities spanning all
50 states and other U.S. territories.2 Over its lifetime, the
NFIP has provided more than $68 billion to help policyholders rebuild their homes in the aftermath of inland
floods and coastal storms.3 As a result of the staggering
losses from the 2017 hurricane season, the U.S. Congress
canceled $16 billion of debt accrued by the NFIP.4 Even so,
as of July 2018, the NFIP remained $20.5 billion in debt
because it collects too little in insurance premiums from
policyholders to cover the damages it must pay out.5
More importantly, these debts represent more than a fiscal crisis and taxpayer burden, they indicate the prevalence
of hundreds of thousands of American households living
under the threat of devastating loss. Hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria alone damaged close to 100,000 homes
and businesses.6 And since the inception of the NFIP, more
than 1.8 million claims have been paid out.7 Many of these
claims are for the same repeatedly damaged structures.8
When a house floods, damages can include waterlogged
drywall, warped floors, damaged mechanical systems, and
potential mold infestations, not to mention the disruption
to people’s lives through the loss of sentimental family heirlooms, income, or, in the worst case, a loved one.
Climate change will continue to drive these debts and
hardships ever higher by increasing flood risks through the
United States. It is well established that climate change
increases flood risk through a number of factors that combine synergistically, including heavier precipitation events,
sea-level rise, and greater storm surge. The U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program (USGCCRP), the body
designated by Congress to determine the state of climate
science to inform federal policy, finds that heavy precipita2.

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.
8.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Policy Statistics Countrywide, https://perma.cc/3NR6-RSZF (last updated Sept. 30, 2018). Roughly, 20% of the nationwide policy base is subsidized. Holders of these policies
pay premiums that are 40% to 45% of their true risk rate. See Government
Accountability Office (GAO), Flood Insurance: More Information
Needed on Subsidized Properties 6 (2013) (GAO-13-607).
FEMA, NFIP Loss Statistics Countrywide, https://perma.cc/KV55-V7TW
(last updated Sept. 30, 2018).
Diane P. Horn & Baird Webel, Congressional Research Service, Private Flood Insurance and the National Flood Insurance Program
1 (2018) (stating Congress canceled $16 billion of NFIP debt to allow the
program to pay claims).
Diane Horn, Congressional Research Service, CRS Insight: National Flood Insurance Program Borrowing Authority 5 (2018)
(showing the NFIP had accrued $20.5 billion in debt). See also U.S. GAO,
Flood Insurance: Comprehensive Reform Could Improve Solvency
and Enhance Resilience 1 (2017) (GAO-17-425) (stating the debt level
in March 2017, before Hurricanes Harvey, Maria, and Irma, stood at $24.6
billion due and collection of premiums would likely be insufficient to repay
the debt), available at https://perma.cc/F6FL-3GXL
FEMA, Significant Flood Events, https://www.fema.gov/significant-floodevents (last updated Jan. 30, 2019).
Supra note 3.
FEMA, Severe Repetitive Loss Property Data, 1978-2015, acquired June
7, 2016, by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) through a
Freedom of Information Act request submitted June 20, 2014 [hereinafter
FEMA SRLP Data].
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tion events have increased in both intensity and frequency
in most parts of the United States.9
In their most recent assessment, the USGCCRP concludes that global average sea levels will rise by one to four
feet by 2100 and that a rise of as much as eight feet by 2100
is possible.10 Further, sea-level rise along the East and Gulf
Coasts of the United States will exceed the global average. Rising sea levels have already increased the number of
tidal floods each year that cause minor impacts (also called
“nuisance floods”) by fivefold to tenfold since the 1960s in
several U.S. coastal cities, and this trend is already accelerating in more than 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities.11
A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)sponsored study conducted by AECOM, a multinational
engineering firm, estimates the Special Flood Hazard Area
(SFHA), the area within the 100-year floodplain subject
to development restrictions under the NFIP, will grow
by between 40% to 45% by 2100, depending on whether
coastal recession is assumed or not.12 Under the assumption
of a fixed shoreline, AECOM projects that the total number
of NFIP policies may increase by approximately 100% by
2100 due to the combination of population growth and a
larger SFHA due to climate change.13 Under this scenario,
the average loss cost per policy may increase approximately
90% by 2100, and the average premium per policy would
need to increase as much as 70% in today’s U.S. dollars by
2100 in order to offset the projected increase in loss cost.14
Sea-level rise will also further exacerbate the cycle of
“flood, rebuild, repeat” plaguing the NFIP. A proportionally small number of properties that are repeatedly repaired
and rebuilt in areas vulnerable to flooding, called “severe
repetitive loss” (SRL) properties, contribute to the rising
debts of the program. The NFIP paid $5.5 billion to repair
and rebuild more than 30,000 SRL properties between
1978 and 2015.15 These SRL properties constitute only
0.6% of the 5.1 million properties insured through the
NFIP, but have consumed a disproportionate 9.6% of all
damages paid out of the NFIP as of 2015.16 The Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that three
feet of sea-level rise by 2100 could result in an additional
9.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Donald J. Wuebbles et al., Executive Summary, in Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I 20 (D.J.
Wuebbles et al. eds., U.S. Global Change Research Program 2017), https://
perma.cc/9GYV-ZKDV.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 27.
AECOM, The Impact of Climate Change and Population Growth
on the National Flood Insurance Program Through 2100, at
ES-7 (2013), https://perma.cc/5RVD-A4VQ. Coastal recession assumes the shoreline retreats inland, which could serve to reduce the size
of the floodplain.
Id.
Id. at ES-8.
Robert Moore, NRDC, Seeking Higher Ground: How to Break the
Cycle of Repeated Flooding With Climate-Smart Flood Insurance
Reforms 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/Q66X-D4HE.
Id.
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820,000 SRL properties, and six feet of sea-level rise would
result in 2.57 million more SRL properties.17

II.

Encouraging Relocation of the Most
Vulnerable Homeowners Through
“Discounts for Buyouts”

The NFIP’s emphasis on helping policyholders repeatedly
rebuild their homes in the aftermath of a flood disaster is
an increasingly problematic feature of the program. Typically, when a homeowner with NFIP coverage files a damage claim, he or she will receive payment and rebuild or
repair the home in the same exact location. The result is
that a growing number of people find themselves trapped
in a cycle of “flood, rebuild, repeat.”
The NFIP could be substantially improved through a
mechanism that makes it easier for a homeowner to choose
to relocate to a safer location, an action millions of Americans may need to do in the coming decades as sea level
rises.18 Below, we discuss the structure and logic behind
a “discounts for buyouts” mechanism that would allow
homeowners to receive a discount on their insurance premium in exchange for their advance agreement to sell their
property and relocate once their home becomes substantially damaged by flooding.

A.

The Climate Change-Heightened Challenge
of SRL Properties

As discussed above, the debts of the NFIP accrue disproportionately from a small subset of properties that are repeatedly repaired and rebuilt in areas vulnerable to flooding,
called SRL properties. FEMA data indicate that SRL properties flood every two to three years and have been rebuilt
an average of five times.19 Climate change and sea-level rise
will only deepen the issue of SRL properties. NRDC has
estimated that if sea levels rise three to six feet by the end
of the century, the NFIP could pay between $143 billion
and $447 billion in flood insurance claims to the owners
of 820,000 to 2.16 million homes to repeatedly rebuild in
coastal areas.20 This is only a portion of the estimated 4.2
to 13.1 million homes that may be inundated by three to
six feet of sea-level rise.21
In at least some cases, it would be more cost effective to
purchase SRL properties if homeowners want to relocate,
rather than repeatedly rebuild. SRL properties are predom17. Id. at 12.
18. See generally Matthew Hauer et al., Millions Projected to Be at Risk From
Sea-Level Rise in the Continental United States, 6 Nature Climate Change
691 (2016) (projecting three feet of sea-level rise could inundate 4.2 million
Americans and six feet of sea-level rise could inundate 13.1 million Americans by 2100).
19. FEMA SRLP Data, supra note 8.
20. These projections are based on the likely number of properties that could be
affected by sea-level rise, the proportion of those properties that are likely to
have NFIP coverage, and the average cumulative amount of damage suffered
by repeatedly flooded properties. Moore, supra note 15, at 2, 10-13.
21. See Hauer et al., supra note 18, at 691.
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inantly single-family homes (81%), but also include multiunit structures, larger residential buildings, and business
properties.22 Generally, it is more likely for homes with a
lower property value to suffer flood damages that exceed
the property’s value. Among SRL single-family homes
worth less than $250,000, the average sum of all damages ($133,923) exceeded the value of the average home
($109,882).23 For this subset of properties, the NFIP is
expending greater resources keeping these homeowners in
a highly vulnerable situation than it would expend to help
them move to a safer location.
However, if the NFIP placed less emphasis on rebuilding after a flood, and instead offered the homeowners the
option to receive assistance to relocate to higher ground,
then vulnerable households could avoid the “flood, rebuild,
repeat” trap. The assistance to relocate could be provided
by the NFIP in the form of a guarantee to purchase qualifying properties, also known as a “buyout.” Buyouts can
both lower the amount of flood damage claims paid by
the NFIP and enable homeowners to relocate, avoiding
the hardship of additional floods. Yet, only one in five of
30,000 SRL properties analyzed by NRDC (5,961 properties) received some form of federal financial assistance
to reduce the overall risk of flood damage, usually by
elevating the house on pilings, raising the foundation, or
relocating.24 Of those who received assistance, only 2,601
property owners received buyouts, enabling them to move
to higher ground.25

B.

The “Discounts for Buyouts” Proposal

The NFIP can help address these challenges through a
“discounts for buyouts” program that would offer qualifying homeowners a guarantee of a future buyout as a
benefit of their flood insurance coverage, in exchange for
a discounted insurance rate.26 Under the “discounts for
buyouts” proposal, qualifying homeowners would voluntarily commit to accepting a buyout of the home when it
is substantially damaged in a future flood disaster.27 This
agreement would ensure that homeowners who want to
move will receive assistance to relocate to higher ground.
The local community or the state would be responsible
for purchasing the damaged home using funds provided
by FEMA through the National Flood Insurance Fund.28
Once the buyout is complete, the damaged home would be
demolished, the property would become open space, and
the owners would move to a safer location.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

FEMA SRLP Data, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Becky Hayat & Robert Moore, Addressing Affordability and Long-Term Resiliency Through the National Flood Insurance Program, 45 ELR 10338 (Apr.
2015), available at https://is.gd/Sulnyh.
27. “Substantial damage” is defined as damage exceeding 50% of the fair market
value of the property. See also 42 U.S.C. §4014(a)(2)(E).
28. Premiums from the sale of flood insurance are deposited in the National
Flood Insurance Fund, which is then used to pay damage claims. See also id.
§4017.
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The “discounts for buyouts” approach differs from
FEMA’s current practice for purchasing properties in at
least one important way: much of the work is done before
a flood occurs, rather than months afterward. Under this
proposal, the homeowner would have the option to lock in
a guaranteed buyout before the next major flood occurs.
This option would be available through a three-way agreement between the homeowner, FEMA, and the local community or state that would establish a minimum purchase
price. FEMA would agree to provide funding to purchase
the home through the NFIP, and the state or local community would be responsible for taking ownership of the
property from the owner, demolishing the structure, and
maintaining the resulting open space in the future. Key
factors such as eligibility and initial valuation of the home
would be established in advance of a flood. This buyout
agreement would be documented on the deed for the property to ensure transparency and clarity.
This “discounts for buyouts” proposal is not intended
to replace FEMA’s current mechanisms for supporting
buyouts, but would complement those existing efforts by
addressing barriers posed by long lag times and uncertainty
in the existing buyout program. Currently, months may
pass before a homeowner is even approached about having
his or her property purchased. By that time, most affected
homeowners have completed repairs and are no longer
interested in moving. Even for those who are interested,
years can go by before the local government receives funding from FEMA.29 These delays create a race against the
clock, leaving the homeowner to hope that the purchase
will go through before another flood hits.
Moreover, not all interested homeowners are guaranteed
that their homes will be purchased. Ultimately, the number of flood-prone homes purchased is dependent on the
amount of funding, the number of homeowners interested
in being bought out, and the number of owners who see
the process through to the end. This combination of factors
injects a huge amount of uncertainty.
The “discounts for buyouts” approach presents a potential win-win scenario, benefiting homeowners, the local
government, and FEMA. For the homeowner, it helps avoid
the scenario of filing a flood damage claim and repairing a
home, only to be approached about a buyout months later
and enduring a multi-year wait before knowing whether
the property will be purchased. For the local government,
securing agreements for purchasing properties in advance
of the next flood allows it to plan for a future where fewer
people live in flood-prone areas. For FEMA and the NFIP,
they could more quickly and cost effectively eliminate the
financial exposure of paying future damage claims on a
property that has proven to be repeatedly susceptible to
flood damage. Voluntary pre-flood agreements would help
29. Alex Greer & Sherri Brokopp Binder, A Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?, 27 Housing Pol’y Debate 372
(2016); Snohomish County Public Works Surface Water Management, Washington State Emergency Management Division, Voluntary Floodplain Home Buyout Program (2016), https://snohomishcountywa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/6345.
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expedite the actual purchase of the property after a flood
damages a home, sparing both the owner and the community the years of uncertainty that are an unfortunate reality
of traditional buyouts.30

C.

Prioritization of Assistance to Low- and
Middle-Income Families

Under the approach recommended here, the NFIP should
prioritize assistance to low- and middle-income families
who live in areas at high risk of flooding now or in the
future. Voluntary participation in the buyout program
could be available to individuals meeting the following
suggested criteria:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

The homeowner has flood insurance, and the
property is valued at less than $250,000 (the maximum insurable value under the NFIP).
The owner is low- or middle-income (earns
less than 120% of adjusted median income for
the community).
The property has a history of being damaged
in floods or is at a high risk of being flooded in
the future.
The property is located in a community that
supports and promotes efforts to help people
relocate from flood-prone areas and is willing to
take ownership.
FEMA determines that it would be cost effective
to purchase the property, rather than have the
NFIP continue to pay to rebuild.

The “discounts for buyouts” proposal would enable
many low- and middle-income homeowners to move
out of harm’s way, including those who currently cannot
secure assistance to do so. As an added benefit, homeowners would qualify for lower flood insurance premiums and
would be able to continue living in their community until
their home is heavily damaged, triggering the buyout of
the property that enables them to relocate. This reduced
premium might also encourage more homeowners to sign
up for coverage, addressing a critical challenge of underinsurance in the floodplain. In the NFIP flood zones, the
insurance take-up rate is a mere 50% and far less outside
these zones.31
30. Under this program, FEMA and the owner would have already settled on an
approximate pre-flood purchase price and FEMA would have determined
that purchasing the property would save the NFIP more money than paying
repeated damage claims above a certain threshold. Once the property passes
that threshold of damage, FEMA and the local community would immediately proceed with the purchase using NFIP funds. This would cut the time
for buyouts dramatically, compared with the years-long process of FEMA’s
laborious grants programs.
31. Center for Insurance Policy and Research, National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, CIPR Study: Flood Risk and Insurance
3 (2017), https://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_study_1704_flood_risk.
pdf.
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If such an option were made available to low- and middle-income owners of homes valued at less than $250,000
who meet the criteria described above, NRDC estimated
that the NFIP could help 0.51 to 1.59 million eligible families move out of areas vulnerable to sea-level rise. NRDC
estimates indicate that acquiring all of these properties
would cost from $52 billion to $163 billion between now
and the end of the century, at an annual cost of about
$600 million to $2.0 billion.32 Despite the substantial
cost, purchasing this many properties would actually represent significant savings over the existing approach of
“flood, rebuild, repeat.” NRDC estimates damages to the
same pool of properties would be between $72 billion and
$224 billion, or an annual cost of about $900 million to
$2.76 billion.33 Moreover, buyouts offer additional benefits
to homeowners, who will be spared the trauma of ruined
property and possessions, inability to go to work or school,
exposure to mold, and other flood-related problems.
The above estimate assumes that all qualified owners
will accept a buyout and relocate. Clearly, some property
owners will not. The choice to sell a home and relocate is
a challenging decision with multiple variables that could
lead homeowners to choose to stay put. However, in many
cases, homeowners want to break the cycle of flooding and
rebuilding but are unable to afford to simply abandon their
home and are unwilling or unable to sell it to the next
unsuspecting buyer. A study by the University of Illinois
found that 68% of floodplain property owners surveyed
would consider signing up for a voluntary pre-flood buyout program.34

III. Lowered and Cumulative Substantial
Damage Thresholds
Buyouts will not be appropriate for all homes damaged by
flooding, but communities can transition a broader category of existing structures out of the cycle of “flood, rebuild,
repeat” by triggering them to come into compliance with
previously adopted local building, zoning, and floodplain
regulations. When buildings in the SFHA undergo repair
or improvement, it creates an opportunity to reduce the
vulnerability of individual structures to future flood damages. The NFIP requires participating communities to
adopt a local substantial improvement/substantial damage
(SI/SD) standard, which requires property owners making
significant repairs to bring their structure into compliance
with the community’s current building, zoning, and floodplain management requirements.35 For example, the SI/SD
32. See Moore, supra note 15, app. 1, for a description of how these estimates
were made.
33. Id.
34. Collin Reeser, Homeowner Willingness to Pay for a Pre-Flood Buyout Agreement 21 (2016) (M.S. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
35. 44 C.F.R. §60.3(a)-(c) (providing regulatory requirements for new construction and substantial improvement under the NFIP); see also FEMA, Substantial Improvement/Substantial Damage Desk Reference (2010)
(FEMA P-578), https://perma.cc/UHK8-GXBZ; Fact Sheet, FEMA, NFIP
“Substantial Damage”—What Does It Mean? (Oct. 6, 2017) [hereinafter
FEMA Fact Sheet] (offering alternative options to elevating a structure, in-
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standard may require a structure to be elevated to the base
flood elevation level, usually the height of a 100-year flood.
Currently, many communities adopt FEMA’s definition
of “substantial damage” as damage of any origin sustained
by a structure for which the cost of repairing the structure would equal or exceed 50% of the market value of the
structure before the damage occurred.36 The “substantial
improvement” standard similarly applies for renovation or
improvement work to a structure.37 When the costs of an
improvement or repair of damage to a structure surpass this
threshold, the structure must be brought into compliance
with current community floodplain management requirements. For example, if a home, located in the SFHA (1%
annual chance floodplain) was built before the community
joined the NFIP and it was damaged by 50% of its predamage market value, the home would most likely have
to be elevated to, at a minimum, the base flood elevation.
The SI/SD requirement provides a critical lever to
enhance resilience to climate change and break the cycle
of sinking taxpayer dollars into repeatedly rebuilding
and repairing the same vulnerable structures. It creates
an opportunity to make communities stronger, safer, and
smarter while reducing future damage costs. However, in
practice, it has several limitations. First, the prevalence
of SRL properties demonstrates buildings are repeatedly
damaged by flooding events below the 50% threshold and
rebuilt. Since the standard is not cumulative, meaning it
requires a one-time event that surpasses the 50% to trigger compliance, it does not sum up these repeated repairs
and potentially creates a perverse incentive to do multiple
repairs over time to avoid exceeding the threshold with any
single repair.
Second, it fails to incentivize increasing resilience to
flooding of buildings that are heavily damaged, but below
the somewhat arbitrary 50% damage threshold. For example, a lower threshold of 25% damage would more rapidly
bring the existing housing stock up to code, decreasing
vulnerability for future floods. Third, it creates an incentive to lowball damage estimates to help residents avoid
the high costs of bringing structures into compliance
with flood ordinances. An investigation by the Houston
Chronicle indicates the intentional lowballing of damage
estimates is pervasive nationwide.38 The Chronicle examined claims records for more than 36,000 SRL properties,
and found about 16% had “evidence of being substantially
damaged—beyond the 50 percent threshold—at least once
cluding demolishing or relocating a residential structure or floodproofing a
nonresidential structure), available at https://perma.cc/2B69-F4DU.
36. See 44 C.F.R. §59.1 (defining “substantial damage” as “damage of any origin
sustained by a structure whereby the cost of restoring the structure to its
before damaged condition would equal or exceed 50 percent of the market
value of the structure before the damage occurred”).
37. Id. (defining “substantial improvement” to apply for “any reconstruction,
rehabilitation, addition, or other improvement of a structure” for which the
estimated cost equals or exceeds 50% of the market value of the structure
prior to “start of construction” of the improvement).
38. Mark Collette, Flood Games: Manipulation of Flood Insurance Leads to Repeat Disasters, Houston Chron., July 5, 2018, https://www.houston
chronicle.com/business/article/Flood-Games-How-victims-local-officialsand-an-13031069.php.
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before flooding again.”39 Lax enforcement of the SD standard and its correlation to repeated flooding has been recognized for more than 20 years as a major shortcoming of
the NFIP.40

A.

Lower Flood Insurance Premiums for
Communities With More Rigorous
SI/SD Standards

The NFIP provides a mechanism to incentivize communities to take on more rigorous SI/SD standards to ensure
better flood protection. Communities with stronger flood
protection regulations than those mandated by the NFIP
can join the NFIP’s Community Rating System (CRS)
and receive a discount on flood insurance premiums for
their residents. Communities receive credit points for the
different activities they take to reduce flood losses. Based
on their score classification, communities can receive up
to 45% off flood insurance premiums for residents in their
communities.41 As of 2017, nearly 3.6 million policyholders in 1,444 communities participated in the CRS.42 Of
the more than 22,000 communities participating in the
NFIP, only 5% participate in the CRS program, but more
than 69% of all flood insurance policies are written in
CRS communities.43
The CRS program principally rewards higher regulatory standards for floodplain development, including two
reforms for stronger SI/SD standards. The first option is
a “cumulative substantial improvement” (CSI) standard
under which all improvements or repairs during a certain period of time are counted cumulatively toward the
SI requirement. This prevents owners from undertaking many small repairs over time that eventually would
add up to a larger repair. For example, this standard may
count all repairs from major flood events over a 10-year
period cumulatively toward a 50% threshold of SD. The
second option is a “lower substantial improvement” (LSI)
standard, which uses a threshold lower than 50% of the
building’s value to determine when the SI requirement
takes effect. For example, it might trigger requirements to
elevate or make buildings more flood resilient if a flood
causes damages that equal or are greater than 25% of the
pre-damage market value.
Among the 1,444 communities participating in the
CRS program, roughly one-third receive points for taking
some action toward instituting a more rigorous cumula39. Id.
40. David Conrad et al., National Wildlife Federation, Higher Ground:
A Report on Voluntary Property Buyouts in the Nation’s Floodplains, a Common Ground Solution Serving People at Risk, Taxpayers, and the Environment (1998) (stating “that large numbers of substantially damaged properties have apparently not been elevated or removed as
required, and substantial damage requirements have often not been enforced
in many communities”), available at https://perma.cc/3AMV-EQ35.
41. FEMA, CRS Credit for Higher Regulatory Standards 1 (2006),
available at https://perma.cc/EM77-YAHT.
42. Fact Sheet, FEMA, Community Rating System (2017), available at https://
perma.cc/DW5Q-VNMH.
43. Id.
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tive or lower threshold SI or SD standard.44 Among these
communities, ISO Community Hazard Mitigation, the
consulting company employed to manage the NFIP data
set, identifies at least 309 communities receiving CSI
credit for a cumulative SI or SD standard with at least a
10-year tracking requirement and at least 90 communities
receiving credit for at least a five-year tracking requirement
(see Table 1).45 Collectively, these communities represent
roughly one-quarter of CRS communities (399 of 1,444,
or 27.6%), and a much smaller percentage of communities
participating in the wider NFIP.46
Even fewer communities utilize a threshold below 50%
of market value for measuring SD or SI. FEMA data
identify 25 communities receiving credit for LSI1, which
requires a less than 50% threshold, and 32 communities
receiving credit for LSI2, with a regulatory threshold that
is no more than 25% of the square footage of the building’s
lowest floor.47

B.

State Model Flood Ordinances

The low penetration of communities with higher SI/SD
standards in the NFIP indicates an opportunity to increase
44. FEMA, 2007 and 2013 CSI and LSI Communities Data, E-Mails from
David Arkens, ISO/CRS Technical Coordinator, ISO Community Hazard Mitigation, to Joel Scata, Attorney, NRDC (June-Oct. 2018) [hereinafter FEMA CSI and LSI Data] (on file with authors). These datasheets
were obtained via e-mail from David Arkens on August 20, 2018. The
data are the most recent from FEMA based on their 2007 and 2013
manuals listing all CRS communities that received points toward CSI or
LSI standards for those years. The datasheets showed 522 of 1,433 communities received points.
45. ISO CRS SI/SD Standards Data, E-Mails from David Arkens, ISO/CRS
Technical Coordinator, ISO Community Hazard Mitigation, to Joel Scata,
Attorney, NRDC (June-Oct. 2018) (on file with authors). ISO Community
Hazard Mitigation maintains CRS data for FEMA and these estimates are
based on their most current spreadsheets, which are based on data from the
2007 and 2013 FEMA manuals, but with a further level of detail than the
FEMA CSI and LSI data sheets that he was able to provide to us. David
Arkens reported 134 communities with a 10-year CSI requirement, 121
communities with a 10-year cumulative SD requirement from their 2013
data, and an additional 175 communities with a 10-year CSI or cumulative
SD requirement from the 2007 data. Mr. Arkens confirmed the 2007 communities did not overlap with the 2013 communities.
		 To estimate communities with a 10-year cumulative tracking requirement, we combined the 134 “2013 communities” with an SI standard with
the 175 “2007 communities.” This may result in a lower estimate of communities because some additional 2013 communities may have an SD standard without an SI standard, but as SI is frequently defined to include SD,
this approach avoids a high level of potential overlap between the 2013 SI
and SD communities.
		 The same approach was used for calculating communities with a fiveyear cumulative standard. The data received on communities with a fiveyear standard were 80 communities with a five-year CSI requirement in the
2013 manual, 66 communities with a five-year cumulative SD requirement
in the 2013 manual, and 10 communities with a five-year CSI or cumulative SD requirement in the 2007 manual.
46. While additional non-CRS communities have adopted cumulative standards, there is no recordkeeping to track what percentage of these communities have adopted higher standards. We assume that adoption of cumulative standards would be much less frequent in non-CRS communities than
CRS communities. However, a floodplain manager from Illinois reports
that there are many non-CRS communities in Illinois that have adopted the
cumulative standard. See E-Mail from Paul Osman, Chief, Statewide Floodplain Programs, Illinois Office of Water Resources, to Joel Scata, Attorney,
NRDC (Dec. 10, 2018, 1:39 CST) (on file with the authors).
47. Id.
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Table 1. CRS Communities With a Cumulative SD and/or SI Standard (2007 and 2013 Data)
Number of Communities
Receiving CRS Credit
for Standard

Percent of CRS Communities
Receiving CRS Credit
for Standard

10-Year Tracking Requirement

309

21.4%

5-Year Tracking Requirement

90

6.2%

Total

399

27.6%

Standard

Source: ISO CRS SI/SD Standards Data, E-mails From David Arkens, ISO/CRS Technical Coordinator, ISO Community Hazard
Mitigation, to Joel Scata, Attorney, NRDC (June-Oct. 2018) (on file with authors).

the resilience of communities to flooding and the adaptability of the NFIP through wider adoption. While communities must individually choose to adopt higher standards,
states can help promote greater adoption of more stringent
standards through a variety of mechanisms. Many states
have model flood ordinances that communities can adopt.48
Several states have multiple ordinances that are tailored to
meet the respective needs of communities with different
zones from the flood maps.49 Others distinguish between
riverine or coastal communities.50 Some states have separate ordinances with higher standards for CRS communities.51 In addition to model ordinances, states may also
provide regulatory language for SI/SD standards through
building codes, other flood regulations, quick guides, desk
references, or strategic plans.
We surveyed state model flood ordinances and related
documents to assess how frequently these documents
endorse standard NFIP requirements for SI/SD versus how
frequently they provide models for a higher standard (see
Table 2). Of 50 states surveyed, we were able to obtain and
review ordinances or other regulations containing SI/SD
standards for 39 states.52 Roughly one-half of these ordinances provided only the standard FEMA definition for

SD. Another 12 provided the standard FEMA definition,
but also suggested optional text for more stringent requirements in at least one of their ordinances. It is worth noting
that additional states outline options for more protective
requirements in instruction documents or guidance associated with their ordinances. Only eight states utilize a more
stringent definition of SD or SI as the default text of their
ordinances, rather than optional, additional text.

C.

Benefits and Challenges

Community adoption of an SI/SD standard to calculate
damages cumulatively over time and to be triggered for
damages and repair work worth less than 50% of the fair
market value of the structure can help the NFIP better
weather a changing climate, lessen the taxpayer burden,
and increase the safety of millions of homeowners. Through
model flood ordinances, building codes, other regulations,
and guidance, states have several mechanisms to encourage
municipalities and counties to adopt these more protective
standards. Communities will yield three primary benefits
from adoption of such standards.53
1.

48. State-level model ordinances are dependent on municipal-level authorities
to adopt the relevant standards. In certain states, legal authority to adopt
these standards must be delegated to municipalities. Municipalities and
counties should carefully review their local authorities before adopting
any standards.
49. See, e.g., State of Delaware, Shoreline & Waterway Management—Ordinance
Revision Resources, https://perma.cc/9R6N-KBNB (last visited Oct. 16,
2018).
50. See, e.g., Alabama Department of Economic and Community Affairs, Office of Water Resources, NFIP Community Participation Resources (linking
to respective model flood ordinances for coastal and riverine communities),
https://perma.cc/MS9R-FFC4 (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
51. See, e.g., Idaho’s Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance—Idaho Model Ordinance for CRS Communities, E-Mail from Maureen O’Shea, State NFIP
Coordinator, Idaho Department of Water Resources (Sept. 19, 2018) (on
file with authors).
52. For states without ordinances available online, we contacted state agencies
responsible for floodplain management to obtain copies of any existing ordinances. In cases where an ordinance was subsequently provided, we included those in our data set. Twelve states either did not have an ordinance
or did not have an ordinance available online and did not respond to our
queries to provide a copy. Of the remaining 38 states, we included a building code for Michigan and the Hawaii county ordinances, which are where
those states use the FEMA definitions of SD and SI.

2.

Communities can better protect people and
property by bringing older housing stock into
current floodplain management requirements
more expediently.
Adoption of a certain cumulative threshold meets
Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage
requirements, a program that may provide up to
$30,000 to help cover the cost of flood mitigation
measures, like elevation of the home.54

53. For further discussion of these benefits, see Dena Adler & Joel Scata,
Breaking the Cylce of “Flood-Rebuild-Repeat”: Local and State
Options to Improve Substantial Damage and Improvement Standards in the National Flood Insurance Program 14-17 (2019),
https://perma.cc/B9Z6-HEZB.
54. To be eligible for ICC coverage, an NFIP policyholder must suffer a flood
loss and be declared “substantially damaged” or “repetitively damaged.” To
receive ICC coverage for the latter, the community must adopt and uniformly enforce a repetitive loss provision or a cumulative substantial damage
provision in its floodplain management laws or regulations. FEMA defines
“qualifying repetitive damage” as damage where “[t]he cost to repair the
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Table 2. SI/SD Standards in State Model
Flood Ordinances
Total States for Which Model Flood
Ordinance or Similar Document
Reviewed*

39

Ordinances Using Standard FEMA
Definition of SD/SI

19

Ordinances With Optional Language
for a Cumulative Damage Standard

12

Ordinances With Optional Language
for a Lower Threshold Damage
Standard

4

Ordinances With Primary Definition
of SI or SD as a Cumulative Standard

8

Ordinances With Primary Definition
of SI or SD as a Lower Threshold
Standard

0

* The remaining 11 states either (1) did not have a model flood
ordinance or (2) did not have an ordinance publicly available
online and officials did not respond to requests to provide a
copy of the ordinances.

3.

Communities can receive CRS credit, which
will help communities attain a higher CRS
ranking and, thus, reduced insurance costs for
their residents.

Nevertheless, in effectively raising the SI/SD standard
challenges arise related to tracking, financing, and equity.
Several strategies can mitigate these challenges. First,
states should introduce disclosure laws that track expenditures for repairs and damages over time so that new
owners are aware of their property’s history. Since damages and improvements to a structure carry with the property during a transfer of ownership, disclosure laws that
track cumulative improvements and damage would help
protect prospective homeowners from expensive surprises.
Without such disclosure laws, homeowners could unknowflood damage, on average, equaled or exceeded 25% of the market value of
the building at the time of each of the two flood losses, or cumulatively total
50% of the pre-flood market value, as defined by the local floodplain ordinance.” See FEMA, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About
Increased Cost of Compliance 1 (2017) (FEMA P-1080), https://perma.cc/6CKC-Y8W6.
		 While ICC coverage previously required flood-related damage to equal
or exceed 50% of the market value for the structure, FEMA has authorized
ICC coverage if a community has adopted a lower threshold. FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program Policy Issuance No. 01-2011, at 2 (2011)
(stating that ICC claims are authorized for an SD threshold that has been
adopted and uniformly enforced by the community that may be lower than
50%), https://perma.cc/UP4U-MHG2.
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ingly purchase a property that is close to the threshold, and
then due to a small improvement or repair may cross that
threshold and be obligated to bring the entire structure
into compliance with the community’s floodplain management requirements.55 As ICC coverage is only available
for flood-related damage that satisfies FEMA’s repeatedly
flooded damage requirements, the new homeowner could
be burdened by a substantial expense.
Second, ICC coverage may not be adequate to assist
with all required mitigation measures due to the SI/SD
threshold being triggered.56 High flood-risk communities may consider innovative supplemental financing
mechanisms such as purchasing parametric insurance and
catastrophe bonds. Parametric insurance is a risk transfer
arrangement that, unlike indemnity insurance, does not
indemnify one for the full loss caused by a disaster event.57
Instead, a purchaser of parametric insurance buys a predefined amount of protection that pays out according to
an agreed-upon triggering event.58 An example would be
a parametric insurance policy that pays out $10 million if
a 0.2% annual chance flood occurs. Parametric insurance
can greatly increase the speed of payout and eliminate disputes over the amount of the payout because these policies
do not require a claims adjustment process,59 but instead
rely on objective, independently collected data.60
The parametric trigger is also utilized in catastrophe
bonds or “cat bonds.” Such bonds create risk-linked securities that transfer the risk of a specified event occurring—
like a certain category hurricane in a particular city—from
an issuer or sponsor to investors. If the qualifying event
occurs, then the investors lose some or all of their principal
and the issuer receives that money to cover its anticipated
losses.61 Catastrophe bonds with a parametric trigger may
be a more attractive alternative than a stand-alone parametric insurance policy, as the cost of coverage may be less
as the insurance provider transfers the risks to capital mar55. Telephone Interview with Paul Osman, Chief, Statewide Floodplain Programs, Illinois Office of Water Resources (Sept. 10, 2018) (Paul Osman has
experienced three to four cases where a home was sold with accumulated
40% to 49% improvement and damage costs, and the buyer was unaware
until they triggered the provision due to a small-scale project).
56. Costs to raise a house are highly variable, but consistently estimated to
be above the ICC cap. See, e.g., Wharton Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes, Post-Flood Mitigation: The NFIP’s
Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) Coverage 4 (2017) (estimating
that home elevation can cost three to five times the ICC cap), https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/WRCib2017cNFIP%E2%80%99s-Increased-Cost-of-Compliance-Coverage.pdf; see also
ImproveNet, How Much Will It Cost to Raise a House Foundation? (estimating the average cost to elevate a home is between $30,000 and $100,000),
https://perma.cc/WX3P-297M (last updated Oct. 5, 2018).
57. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Center for Insurance
Policy and Research, Parametric Disaster Insurance, https://perma.cc/L6EF765S (last updated July 25, 2018).
58. Id. (parametric insurance is not affiliated with the NFIP).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Nathaniel Bullard, Blockchain Used as Settlement Mechanism for Cat Bond
With Parametric Trigger, Ins. J., Aug. 14, 2017, at 9, https://perma.cc/6KJKGT3Y. See also RE.Bound Program, Leveraging Catastrophe Bonds as
a Mechanism for Resilient Infrastructure Project Finance (2015),
https://perma.cc/C6QN-8R5R.
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kets.62 A community could potentially sponsor a parametric cat bond designed to be triggered by a flood event likely
to substantially damage homes and the payouts could be
used by those homeowners to achieve compliance with
floodplain regulations.
Third, the disproportionate effect of flooding on vulnerable and low-income communities must be acknowledged
and mediated. Overall, the NFIP faces a number of equity
challenges. While disasters do not themselves discriminate,
a history of discriminatory policies like redlining and segregation, as well as economic and social disparities, have
located low-income communities and communities of color
in highly vulnerable floodplains in certain states.63 Socially
vulnerable communities were some of those most heavily impacted by flooding after Hurricane Harvey.64 These
vulnerable communities include the elderly, disabled, poor,
and those who do not own a car or cannot speak English.
For several reasons, low-value homes are more likely to
be assessed as substantially damaged.65 First, an equivalent dollar value of damage (e.g., $55,000) would trigger
the 50% SI/SD threshold in a home worth $100,000, but
not a home worth more than $110,000. Further, low-value
homes may be more likely to be more significantly damaged due to location in vulnerable areas, poor construction,
or construction under outdated building codes.66 At least
one study found that officials were more likely to subjectively assess homes in low-income neighborhoods to be substantially damaged than in high-income neighborhoods.67
Our proposed changes to the SI/SD standards would likely
increase the number of homes assessed as substantially
damaged, making it important to bundle these standards
with other reforms to financially assist low-income and
vulnerable communities in bringing their homes into compliance with local floodplain regulations.

62. Michael Edesess, Catastrophe Bonds: An Important New Financial Instrument, 4(3) Alternative Investment Analyst Rev. 6 (2015), available at
https://caia.org/aiar/1957.
63. See, e.g., Tanvi Misra, The Ugly Story of South Dallas, CityLab, May 11,
2016, https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/05/the-ugly-story-of-southdallas/482283/; Marilyn C. Montgomery & Jayajit Chakraborty, Assessing the Environmental Justice Consequences of Flood Risk: A Case Study in
Miami, Florida, 10 Envtl. Res. Letters (2015), available at https://doi.
org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/9/095010. For some of the difficulties in analyzing these trends at the national level, see NYU Furman Center, Data
Brief: Population in the U.S. Floodplains (2017), http://furmancenter.
org/files/Floodplain_PopulationBrief_12DEC2017.pdf.
64. Jeremy Deaton, Hurricane Harvey Hit Low-Income Communities Hardest, ThinkProgress, Sept. 1, 2017, https://thinkprogress.org/hurricaneharvey-hit-low-income-communities-hardest-6d13506b7e60/.
65. Anne Siders, Social Justice Implications of U.S. Managed Retreat Buyout Programs, 152 Climatic Change 239 (2019), available at https://link.springer.
com/article/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5.
66. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
Greater Impact: How Disasters Affect People of Low Socioeconomic Status (2017), https://perma.cc/2KP2-74VK.
67. Daniel H. de Vries & James C. Fraser, Citizenship Rights and Voluntary Decision Making in Post-Disaster U.S. Floodplain Buyout Mitigation Programs, 30
Int’l J. Mass Emergencies & Disasters 1-33 (2012), available at https://
perma.cc/PD98-DPGG.

IV.

4-2019

Increase Transparency of
Flood-Related Risks

Adequate information about flood risk plays an essential
role in identifying properties that can best be served by
flood reform programs, like those summarized earlier in
this Comment, and enabling property owners and buyers
to make informed decisions. Unfortunately, the NFIP is a
relatively opaque program with regard to the availability of
information on flood damages, number and cost of policies, information on repeatedly flooded properties, costs of
the program to the nation, and the level of enforcement
by participating communities. Individual homeowners,
the public, researchers, local officials, and even members
of Congress do not have ready access to basic information
that should be publicly available.
This lack of transparency inhibits communities, developers, and prospective homeowners from making informed
decisions about flood risk. It further prevents development
of informed reforms to the NFIP or complementary stateand local-level policies. Legislative reform at both the
federal and state levels can increase transparency of floodrelated risks.

A.

Federal Transparency Solutions for
Flood-Related Risk Disclosures

At the federal level, several legislative reforms could
directly improve transparency within the NFIP, including
a pair of “right-to-know” provisions and other measures to
enhance disclosure and mandatory identification of most
vulnerable areas. First, a “homeowner right-to-know” provision could provide all homeowners the right to obtain
their property’s history of NFIP claim payments and flood
damages, including under previous owners, from FEMA.
The greater access to information about a property’s flood
risk could spur mitigation actions, thus reducing the fiscal
exposure of the program. Shockingly, FEMA will not provide this information to a homeowner upon request, unless
the homeowner already has purchased an NFIP policy.
This denies homeowners access to critical information that
could help them determine whether they should purchase
an NFIP policy.
Second, a “public right-to-know” provision could direct
FEMA to create a public, open-data system to share information related to a community’s or region’s flood risk,
such as current and historical policy information, the total
number of multiple-loss properties in a community, and
whether a community was in compliance with the NFIP.
This would provide information on repeatedly flooded
homes and areas with high numbers of such homes, as well
as information on outstanding compliance issues in local
communities, that would strengthen future reform efforts.
Third, a set of national real property disclosure requirements for sellers and lessors could ensure homebuyers make
informed purchases, cognizant of past flood damages,
flood risks, and flood insurance obligations that might run
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with a property. A set of national disclosure requirements
would require sellers or lessors of a house to disclose past
flood damages to potential buyers and lessees prior to the
purchase or leasing of the property. This proposal would
have an impact nationwide as states would be required to
enact sufficient flood disclosure laws in order to remain in
the NFIP. These disclosures could also be enacted individually by states, as discussed below. In either case, they
would allow buyers to make informed choices during one
of their most important financial decisions.
Fourth, NFIP-participating communities could be
required to identify their most vulnerable areas and develop
plans to mitigate risks to those areas. This information
could help communities determine how best to utilize their
resources to help individual homeowners increase resilience
in place or determine if coordinated relocation might be an
option. All of the above provisions were included in federal
legislation recently considered by Congress. Indeed, the
U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill (H.R. 2874)
containing these provisions in November 2017.68 However, none of these provisions have yet been passed into
law because the U.S. Senate failed to vote on the bill.69 As
the legislation was introduced during the 115th Congress,
new versions of the proposals will need to be drafted and
introduced in both the House and Senate.

B.

State-Level Solutions for Seller Disclosure
of Flood-Related Risks

To fill the federal gap, states can also directly increase
transparency by establishing or improving their regulatory or statutory requirements for sellers to disclose floodrelated risks before closing. Such disclosures can include
whether a property is in a floodplain, a property’s history of
flood damages, and any requirements to carry flood insurance for the property. Without such requirements, many
homeowners may never learn their home is vulnerable to
flooding until after they find their home quite literally
underwater—a risk increased by sea-level rise and more
frequent and intense extreme weather events. Ironically,
this information may be readily available either from the
seller or from FEMA, which keeps a record of flooding in
all properties that receive insurance through its NFIP.
Our review of all 50 states’ disclosure laws found room
for improvement in the majority of states’ policies (see
Figure 1).70 Twenty-one states lack statutory or regulatory
requirements for sellers to disclose a property’s history of
flood damages or other factors related to flood risk. Many
of these states have private realtor associations that provide
voluntary disclosure forms referencing potential flood haz68. H.R. 2874, 115th Cong. (2017) (homeowner right to know, §108; public
right to know, §204; seller’s disclosure, §109; identification of vulnerable
areas, §402).
69. See Congress.gov, H.R.2874—21st Flood Reform Act: Actions (showing no
action after the bill was referred to the Senate), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2874/actions (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
70. NRDC, How States Stack Up on Flood Disclosure, https://www.nrdc.org/
flood-disclosure-map (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
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ards, but these were not counted since they are not mandatory requirements. The other 29 states, plus Washington,
D.C., at a minimum, require sellers to disclose whether the
property is in a designated floodplain before the point of
sale. Of these, only 10 states additionally require disclosure
of whether there have been any flood damages to structures
on the property.
Even in states with minimum disclosure requirements,
loopholes can undermine their effectiveness. For example,
though New York’s disclosure statute technically prompts
a seller to disclose whether the property is located in a
designated floodplain, the seller can check a box that this
information is unknown.71 Further, a seller can avoid even
this disclosure requirement by paying a $500 fee at closing. More broadly, among the 29 states, plus Washington,
D.C., with disclosure requirements related to flood risk or
damages, at least 26 have various exemptions for property
transfers related to foreclosures and/or deed transfers in
lieu of foreclosures—that is more than 85% of states with
flood-related disclosures.72
Inadequate disclosure laws have real consequences in
a world where flooding is an ever-growing risk for many
communities. In 2017, more than 95,000 NFIP policyholders73 submitted claims to FEMA for about $8.7 billion in damages—the third highest damages payout since
1978.74 The top three most expensive claim years have all
occurred within the past 15 years.75 State adoption of mandatory seller disclosure of flood risks would help ensure
homeowners have the necessary information when making
one of their largest financial investments and more broadly
help break the cycle of investment in properties increasingly vulnerable to flooding. In the absence of federal
action, states can also amend their laws to require sellers to
disclose these critical pieces of information.

V.

Improve Disclosure of Community
Compliance Data and Resources
for Enforcement of the NFIP

Even the most stringent local floodplain regulations are
only as beneficial as their implementation. Academic
research,76 FEMA-commissioned reports,77 independent
71. See New York Real Property Law §462 (2002) (requiring all sellers of residential real property in New York to fill out and sign a “property condition
disclosure statement” form and deliver it to the buyer or buyer’s agent prior
to the sale).
72. Dena Adler, Foreclosure Exemptions to State Flood Risk Disclosure Requirements Sheet, Colum. L. Sch. Sabin Center for Climate Change L., Aug.
16, 2018, https://bit.ly/2X0rnwO.
73. FEMA, Number of Losses Paid by Calendar Year, https://www.fema.gov/
number-losses-paid-calendar-year (last updated Jan. 30, 2019).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See generally Oliver Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 61 (1985) (analyzing the problem of
NFIP enforcement in Louisiana).
77. See generally Jacquelyn Monday et al., American Institutes for Research, An Evaluation of Compliance With the National Flood
Insurance Program Part A: Achieving Community Compliance xxi
(2006) (conducting a comprehensive evaluation of community compli-
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Figure 1. Flood Risk Disclosure Laws (as of June 2018)

None

Inadequate

Adequate

Better

Best

Disclosure Grade
States are graded on a scale of A to F corresponding to the quality of the state’s flood hazard disclosure law (i.e., the
level of flood hazard information required to be disclosed). States with a grade of F have no statutory or regulatory
requirements for a seller to disclose a property’s flood risks or past flood damages to a potential buyer. However,
many of these states have private realtor associations that provide voluntary disclosure forms referencing potential
flood hazards. States with grades of A to D have statutory or regulatory real estate disclosure provisions that mandate
a seller disclose to a potential buyer flood hazard information associated with the property.
Requires disclosure of whether the property is in a designated floodplain, whether there
have been any flood damages to structures on the property, and whether there is any reGrade A (Best)
quirement to carry flood insurance. Also requires additional disclosures, such as the cost
of flood insurance or an elevation certificate.
Requires disclosure of whether the property is in a designated floodplain, whether there
Grade B (Better)
have been any flood damages to structures on the property, and whether there is any requirement to carry flood insurance.
Requires only the disclosure of whether the property is in a designated floodplain and
whether there have been any flood damages to structures on the property. Fails to require
disclosure of whether flood insurance is mandatory. While some states require disclosure
Grade C (Adequate)
of whether flood insurance is maintained on a property, this provision fails to address a
situation in which the current owner does not carry flood insurance even though such
insurance is required, for instance, due to receipt of federal disaster aid.
Requires only the disclosure of whether the property is—before point of sale—in a desGrade D (Inadequate) ignated floodplain. Fails to require disclosure of any flood damages to structures on the
property or disclosure of any requirement to carry flood insurance.
Grade F (None)

No statutory or regulatory requirements for a seller to disclose a property’s flood risks or
past flood damages to a potential buyer.

Source: NRDC in collaboration with the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law.
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investigations,78 and surveys of state and local floodplain
managers79 indicate the existence of compliance and
enforcement challenges that undermine the NFIP’s effectiveness. When communities fail to adequately adopt and
enforce NFIP building and land use standards, people and
property are put at risk, costing the NFIP and the federal
government avoidable expenses.80 Unfortunately, disclosure and transparency of community compliance data by
FEMA is minimal, making a current and comprehensive
assessment of the extent and particular challenges of noncompliance difficult. As climate change continues to exacerbate flooding nationwide, ensuring adequate compliance
with and enforcement of the NFIP will become increasingly important to minimize unnecessary flood damage.
Failure to check risky development in the floodplain
has two primary layers. The first concerns compliance—
whether local communities adopt and enforce the building, zoning, and other floodplain development regulations
to meet the requirements of participating in the NFIP. The
second involves FEMA’s willingness to take enforcement
action by putting noncompliant communities on probation or suspending them from the NFIP if they fail to correct their violation. FEMA has taken limited probation
or suspension enforcement action against noncompliant
communities,81 even when recommended to do so by state
coordinating agencies.82 Even while reserving probation
and suspension as tools of last resort, FEMA can operate
other solutions within its “cooperative enforcement” model
to increase community compliance with the NFIP through
greater provision of financial and training resources for
states and local communities and improved monitoring,
tracking, and transparency of information regarding community compliance.
This part sets up the case for ramping up these cooperative strategies by piecing together the limited information
on community compliance and FEMA enforcement to
illuminate the existence of a compliance problem. Greater

78.

79.

80.
81.

82.

ance); see also Elliott Mittler et al., American Institutes for Research, State Roles and Responsibilities in the National Flood
Insurance Program 52 (2006), noting,
regarding remedying violations, some FEMA Region IX staff perceive difficulty enlisting the support of headquarters to suspend a
community. This perception, whether real or just suspected, may
deter regional staff from conducting mandatory extensive follow-up
on major violations because they are not convinced that enforcement actions will ultimately be imposed.
See Collette, supra note 38; see also Benjamin Lesser & Ryan McNeill,
Unfettered Building, Scant Oversight Add to Cost of Hurricanes in U.S., Reuters, Dec. 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/
usa-flooding-insurance/.
Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM), Floodplain
Management 2017: State Programs (2017), available at https://www.
floodsciencecenter.org/projects/floodplain-management-state-programsupdate-2017/; see also Sherri Brokopp Binder et al., Floodplain Compliance Study (2018) [hereinafter Brokopp Binder Survey] (unpublished report on state and local NFIP compliance prepared for the NRDC)
(on file with authors).
See Monday et al., supra note 77, at 6.
2007 NFIP Compliance Actions—The Cycle of Probation, Remediation, and
Reinstatement, Insider (Association of State Floodplain Managers), Mar.
2008, at 7-8, available at https://www.floods.org/ace-files/newsletter/Insider_Mar_08.pdf.
See Brokopp Binder Survey, supra note 79, at 22.
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reporting, transparency, and resources to address barriers
to implementation can help the NFIP better weather climate-related flooding risks.

A.

Limited Information on Community Compliance

Under the NFIP, communities are considered noncompliant when they fail to adopt or enforce the minimum floodplain management criteria contained in 44 C.F.R. §60.3.83
In general, these criteria include requirements for communities to limit development in the floodplain and ensure
that the development and rebuilding that occurs is done in
a manner to minimize flood risk. It is currently difficult to
assess whether these criteria are adequately implemented by
communities because FEMA has never stated what it considers an “optimal level of compliance” for the NFIP,84 and
NFIP compliance data are not comprehensive or reliable.85
The best publicly available information appears to be
a 2006 FEMA-commissioned report that estimates that
the nationwide rate of community compliance with NFIP
standards is 70% to 85%.86 However, given the lack of
tracking and reporting on community compliance, this
estimate was inferred in part from the percentage of communities audited by FEMA for which either (1) no violations or deficiencies were found in the program, or (2) any
compliance issues were addressed satisfactorily and the
audit process was completed within two years. The report
posited that one of the best available indicators of the number of communities with serious compliance problems are
communities that have an audit held open for longer than
two years, indicating either FEMA or the state coordinating agency had identified compliance problems that were
not resolved. Per the report, that number was about 30%
of all audits conducted over a five-year period for which
records were analyzed.
Though the 2006 report is now more than a decade old,
independent news investigations indicate that compliance
levels continue to be a problem. Though FEMA recommends a community be audited every five years, a 2017
Reuters investigation found “only 23 percent of the more
than 22,000 communities that participate in the flood
insurance program had an audit by federal or state floodplain-management authorities in the eight years ending in
2016.”87 Per the report, Reuters obtained documents from
FEMA that summarized 6,253 audits between 2009 and
2016 in all 50 states. Auditors identified serious compliance issues in 13% of those visits, which included more
than 100 communities with audits that remained open
after three years.88
The Houston Chronicle also conducted a study of FEMA
data revealing that floodplain management officials in
83. FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program Community Compliance
Program Guidance vii (2014) (FEMA P-1022).
84. Monday et al., supra note 77, at 25.
85. Id. at iv-x.
86. Id. at x.
87. See Lesser & McNeill, supra note 78.
88. Id.
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Texas were failing to enforce the NFIP’s SD requirement.89 The Chronicle examined the damage assessments
for thousands of properties flooded by Hurricane Ike, the
majority of which were not declared to be substantially
damaged, despite being inundated at a depth that FEMA
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers consider to cause
major damage.90

B.

Potential Under-Enforcement of
Violations by FEMA

Despite indications of significant compliance issues, available data sources suggest FEMA applies probation and
suspension sparingly. A level of restraint in applying these
mechanisms makes logical sense. FEMA employs probation and suspension as tools of last resort, preferring to help
communities achieve compliance and remain eligible for
the NFIP. However, compliance and enforcement research
has found that “the presence of a credible threat of a penalty is useful and perhaps even necessary to achieve the
highest level of possible compliance.”91
The 2006 FEMA-commissioned report noted that
for the few times FEMA has formally threatened and/or
imposed probation, compliance has been achieved in 85%
of cases.92 However, the same report noted there is a “widespread perception” among FEMA and state staff (“and
perhaps amongst communities”) that FEMA is unlikely to
impose sanctions against communities in direct violation
of the program.93 A lack of credibility concerning proper
enforcement can encourage “bad actors,” which jeopardizes the flood-reduction goals of the program and exposes
the American taxpayer.
FEMA’s enforcement shortcomings may occur both
through a failure to act on reported complaints by issuing probationary notices and a failure to follow through
on those notices by putting communities on probation
if they fail to correct their program violations. The 2006
FEMA-commissioned report estimated that, nationwide,
250 communities every year likely have serious compliance problems, and, thus, are candidates for probation.94
Between 1986 and 2007, the most recent year for which
public data are readily available, 114 communities were
sent formal notice that they would be placed on probation if they failed to correct or remedy identified program
deficiencies or violations.95 Out of the 114 communities,
only 63 were placed on probation.96 Without better monitoring and tracking, it is impossible to determine whether
the threat of probation proved sufficient for a community
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Collette, supra note 38.
Id.
Monday et al., supra note 77, at xii.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106.
2007 NFIP Compliance Actions—The Cycle of Probation, Remediation, and
Reinstatement, supra note 81, at 7-8.
96. Id. at 7 (the remaining communities resolved their noncompliance issues
before probation was imposed).
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to correct a violation prior to enforcement action being
taken or FEMA failed to act. At a minimum, the data indicate the need for better tracking and reporting related to
enforcement action.
Given that FEMA is legally required to publish notice
of impending suspensions in the Federal Register,97 we
attempted to determine FEMA’s recent suspension practices based on a review of Federal Register documents. Our
team reviewed 516 Federal Register documents, published
between January 1, 2009, and July 19, 2018, which revealed
more than 11,700 notifications to communities warning
them of potential suspension. The vast majority of these
communities were notified in batches and these notices
did not specify the cause of the suspension. However, an
examination of these notices revealed the dates of the proposed suspensions matched or closely correlated with deadlines for the communities to adopt new or revised flood
insurance rate maps. Failure to adopt these maps by the
stated deadline is grounds to suspend a community from
the NFIP.98
During this 10-year period, we found only four notices
specifying a compliance- or enforcement-related violation
that were sent to individual communities. One additional
community was notified individually of impending suspension without further descriptive information and for which
the suspension date did not correspond to expiration of a
flood map.99 While optimally communities correct their
violations prior to notice of imminent suspension, the data
suggest that suspension is sufficiently rare that the threat of
enforcement may not be credible.

C.

Improving Compliance Through Greater
Availability of Information and Resources

As climate change makes flooding more likely and extreme,
noncompliance will undercut the nation’s ability to adapt
and prepare. As such, programmatic changes are necessary
that help communities achieve compliance. First, better
tracking and transparency of compliance issues can help
identify the extent and nature of the most common program violations, allowing FEMA to determine how best to
prioritize limited training and financial resources to help
communities achieve compliance. Greater transparency
could discourage violations through community pressure,
especially if residents in noncompliant communities knew
there was a likelihood that their flood insurance rates could
be raised, or worse, that they could be ineligible for certain types of disaster aid if their community came to be
suspended. However, this would require FEMA to use its
enforcement sanctions more readily to make such a threat
credible. The “public right-to-know” proposal, discussed in
97. 44 C.F.R. §59.24.
98. FEMA, Adoption of Flood Insurance Rate Maps by Participating
Communities 4-6 (2012) (FEMA 495), https://perma.cc/JQN8-6RFS.
99. We contacted FEMA officials to confirm or clarify these findings regarding
prevalence of suspension, but did not receive a response. Data underlying
the analysis of Federal Register notices on file with the authors.
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Section IV.A., could be a good structure for providing this
greater transparency.
Second, more human and financial resources would
benefit community compliance. According to FEMA, most
program deficiencies and many violations are due to a lack
of awareness and full understanding of the NFIP’s floodplain management criteria, a lack of technical skills, and a
failure to understand the rationale behind NFIP building
and land use requirements.100 At the local level, floodplain
managers often wear “multiple hats,” have a high turnover
rate, and may lack appropriate training.101 A 2018 survey of
local state floodplain managers corroborated these conclusions, finding that respondents ranked inadequate human
resources and financial resources as the most significant
challenges to enforcement, followed by knowledge of NFIP
requirements, and insufficient technical support.102 Providing local and state managers with greater access to training
and improved recordkeeping and data-sharing could help

100. See FEMA, supra note 83, at 2.
101. See generally 2007 NFIP Compliance Actions—The Cycle of Probation, Remediation, and Reinstatement, supra note 81.
102. See Brokopp Binder Survey, supra note 79, at 4-5.
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head off noncompliance issues before they rise to a level
requiring FEMA enforcement sanctions.
These two measures can help ensure a more robust
response to climate change by supporting implementation
of smarter floodplain development. While a credible threat
of enforcement is part of a cooperative enforcement model,
the ultimate goal of the program is not to suspend communities from the program, but to help them reduce the flood
risk of their citizens.

VI. Conclusion
Climate is already escalating the flood risks facing communities and exacerbating the rising debts of the NFIP. The
four sets of reforms identified by this Comment provide a
road map for potential innovations that Congress can consider when it completes long-term reauthorization of NFIP,
currently scheduled for May 2019.

